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In Quantum Private Query (QPQ), a client obtains values corresponding to his query only and
nothing else from the server and the server does not get any information about the queries. Gio-
vannetti et al. (Phys. Rev. Lett., 2008) gave the first QPQ protocol and since then quite a few
variants and extensions have been proposed. However, none of the existing protocols are device
independent, i.e., all of them assume implicitly that the entangled states supplied to the client and
the server are of certain form. In this work, we exploit the idea of a local CHSH game and connect
it with the scheme of Yang et al. (Quantum Inf. Process., 2014) to present the concept of device
independent QPQ protocol for the first time.
I. INTRODUCTION
During the last two decades, Quantum Key Distribu-
tion (QKD) has remained the main theme of quantum
cryptography. In recent times, however, several other
quantum cryptographic primitives are being explored
and Quantum Private Query (QPQ) is one of them. In
QPQ, a client issues queries to a database and obtains
the real values without knowing anything else about the
database, whereas the server should not gain any infor-
mation about the queries. Here, we assume that Bob
is the database holder or server and Alice is the client.
The first protocol in this domain had been proposed by
Giovannetti et al. [1] followed by [2] and [3]. However,
those scheme are highly theoretical and difficult for im-
plementation. For implementation purpose, Jakobi et
al. [4] came out with a QPQ protocol which was based on
SARG04 quantum key distribution protocol [5]. In 2012,
Gao et al. [6] proposed a flexible generalization of [4].
Rao et al. [7] suggested two more efficient modifications
of classical post-processing in the protocol of Jakobi et
al. In 2013, Zhang et al. [8] proposed a QPQ protocol
based on counterfactual QKD scheme [9]. In 2014, Yang
et al. came out with a flexible QPQ protocol [10] which
was based on B92 quantum key distribution scheme [11].
This domain is gradually improving. It is evident from
the large number of published literatures [12–15] in the
recent two years.
The security of all those protocols is defined on the
basis of the following facts.
(a) Bob knows the whole key which would be used for
the encryption of the database.
(b) Alice knows a fraction of bits of the key.
(c) Bob does not get any information about the posi-
tion of the bits which are known to Alice.
Thus, it is vary natural that in QPQ protocol, there
is no need for an outsider adversary. Unlike QKD, here,
one of the legitimate parties is playing the role of an
adversary. Alice tries to extract more information about
the raw key bits, whereas Bob tries to know the position
of the bits known to Alice.
We identify that the security of all the existing proto-
cols are based on the fact that Bob relies his devices, i.e.,
the source which supplies the qubits and the detectors
which measure the qubits. Thus, similar to the QKD
protocols, trustworthiness of the devices are implicit in
the security proofs of the protocols. In the current work,
we try to understand if we remove such trustworthiness
from the devices like Device Independent QKD [16–20].
In DI-QKD, a statistical test known as Bell test [21]
or CHSH test [22] is performed to verify whether the
shared entangled states between the legitimate parties
are maximally entangled. If the states are maximally en-
tangled, then QKD protocol provides unconditional secu-
rity. However, the test has to be performed non-locally.
In other words, two distant parties (Alice and Bob) have
to be involved in CHSH test.
Very recently, Lim et al. [23] proposed a DI-QKD
scheme where they exploit the idea of local CHSH test.
In local CHSH test, the sender performs CHSH test at his
or her end in the motivation towards certifying whether
the states, going to be used for QKD, are maximally en-
tangled.
In case of QPQ, we identify that if the states shared
between Bob and Alice are not in a certain form, then
Alice can always apply some strategies which help her
to extract more information about the raw key bits than
what is suggested by the protocol. Thus, it is necessary
for Bob to certify whether the states are in the desired
form. Motivated by the idea of local CHSH test by Lim
et al. [23], we, here, propose a protocol which provides
this certification. The value obtained from the test will
depend upon the predefined success probability of Alice
about the raw key bits. In other words, how much infor-
mation about the key has to be allowed to Alice by the
protocol.
Here, we work on the QPQ protocol presented by Yang
et al. [10]. Note that this protocol [10] can be per-
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2formed by a certain kind of mixed state also (namely,
(|0, φ0〉 〈0, φ0|+ |1, φ1〉 〈1, φ1|) /2). Since we try to prove
the device independence security by exploiting the idea of
local CHSH test, we work with the entanglement-based
version. Further, our suggested scheme for testing device
independence lies on top of the QPQ protocol of [10]. One
can replace that QPQ part by any other entanglement-
based QPQ protocol (which might not be performed by
any mixed state) and our scheme will work there too.
QPQ protocol can be viewed as a two-party (mistrust-
ful) cryptography, i.e., two parties that want to perform
a certain task together without fully trusting each other.
In this regard, one may mention [24–28] where similar
ideas have been exploited to propose imperfect coin flip-
ping and bit commitment in DI setting.
We first revisit the protocol of Yang et al. [10]. Next,
we show how Alice could choose a strategy to extract
more information about the raw key bits if the shared
entanglement between her and Bob is not in a desired
form. We, then, come out with the idea of local CHSH
like test which is exploited to certify whether the states
are secure for QPQ protocol. All the lemmas and theo-
rems used to prove the security of the proposed protocol
are given in Appendix A.
II. REVISITING THE PROTOCOL OF [10]
In this section we revisit the protocol for quantum pri-
vate query proposed in [10]. The protocol exploits the
idea of B92 quantum key distribution scheme. There are
two phases in the protocol, namely, key generation and
private query. In the key generation phase, Bob and Al-
ice share entangled states of the form 1√
2
(|0〉B |φ0〉A +
|1〉B |φ1〉A), where, |φ0〉A = cos ( θ2 ) |0〉 + sin ( θ2 ) |1〉 and
|φ1〉A = cos ( θ2 ) |0〉− sin ( θ2 ) |1〉. Here, subscript B stands
for Bob and subscript A stands for Alice. θ may vary
from 0 to pi2 . After receiving the qubits from Bob, Alice
announces the position of the qubits that have ultimately
reached at the end of Alice. Bob discards the lost pho-
tons. After post selection, Bob measures his qubits in
{|0〉B , |1〉B} basis, whereas Alice measures her qubits ei-
ther in {|φ0〉A ,
∣∣φ⊥0 〉A} basis or in {|φ1〉A , ∣∣φ⊥1 〉A} basis
randomly. If the measurement result of Alice gives
∣∣φ⊥0 〉,
she concludes that the raw key bit at Bob’s end must
be 1. If it would be
∣∣φ⊥1 〉, the raw key bit must be 0.
Bob and Alice execute classical post-processing so that
Alice’s information on the key reduces to one bit or more.
Bob knows the whole key, whereas Alice generally knows
several bits of the key.
In the private query phase, if Alice knows the jth bit
of the key K and wants to know the ith element of the
database, she declares the integer s = j − i. Bob shifts
K by s and hence gets a new key, say K0. Bob encrypts
his database by this new key K0 with one-time pad and
sends the encrypted database to Alice. Alice decrypts the
value with her jth key bit and gets the required element
of the database.
The security of the protocol comes from the fact that
Alice knows the final key partially. Thus, even if she
gets access to the whole encrypted database, she can not
obtain the full information about the database. Now, we
will calculate the success probability of Alice to guess a
bit in raw key.
As Bob measures his qubits only in {|0〉B , |1〉B} basis,
he will get either |0〉 with probability 12 or |1〉 with proba-
bility 12 . When Bob gets |0〉, Alice should get |φ0〉. If she
chooses {|φ0〉A ,
∣∣φ⊥0 〉A} basis, she will get |φ0〉 with prob-
ability 1 and never gets
∣∣φ⊥0 〉. However, if she chooses
{|φ1〉A ,
∣∣φ⊥1 〉A} basis, she will get either |φ1〉 with proba-
bility cos2 θ or
∣∣φ⊥1 〉 with probability sin2 θ. We formalize
all the conditional probabilities in the following table.
Cond. Probability of Alice
A=|φ0〉 A=
∣∣∣φ⊥0 〉 A=|φ1〉 A=∣∣∣φ⊥1 〉
B = 0 12 .1
1
2 .0
1
2 . cos
2 θ 12 . sin
2 θ
B = 1 12 . cos
2 θ 12 . sin
2 θ 12 .1
1
2 .0
According to the protocol, when Alice gets
∣∣φ⊥0 〉, she
outputs 1. And when she gets
∣∣φ⊥1 〉, she outputs 0. Thus,
the success probability of Alice to guess a bit in raw key
can be written as Pr(A = B)
= Pr(A = 0, B = 0) + Pr(A = 1, B = 1)
= Pr(B = 0).Pr(A = 0|B = 0) + Pr(B = 1).Pr(A = 1|B = 1)(1)
=
1
2
.Pr(A = φ
⊥
1 |B = 0) +
1
2
.Pr(A = φ
⊥
0 |B = 1).
From the above table, we can see that the success prob-
ability of Alice becomes sin
2 θ
2 .
III. BIASED CHOICE OF ALICE’S BASIS
Suppose, Bob trusts the source, i.e., he believes that
the states shared between Alice and him are of the
certain form [10]. Let, the source supplies some arbi-
trary entangled states (α |0〉B |φ0〉A+β |1〉B |φ1〉A), where|α|2 = ( 12 + ) and |β|2 = ( 12 − ) to Bob. Suppose, Alice
has this information and also the information about the
values of α and β. In this case, she chooses the basis as
follows.
• {|φ0〉A ,
∣∣φ⊥0 〉A} with probability 12 − .
• {|φ1〉A ,
∣∣φ⊥1 〉A} with probability 12 + .
Her success probability can be calculated from the fol-
lowing table.
Cond. Probability of Alice
A=|φ0〉 A=
∣∣∣φ⊥0 〉 A=|φ1〉 A=∣∣∣φ⊥1 〉
B = 0 1.( 1
2
− ) 0 (cos2 θ) ·
(
1
2
+ 
)
(sin2 θ) ·
(
1
2
+ 
)
B = 1 (cos2 θ) ·
(
1
2
− 
)
(sin2 θ) ·
(
1
2
− 
)
1 ·
(
1
2
+ 
)
0
Following Eq. (1), it becomes ( 12 + 2
2) sin2 θ.
3Thus, if Alice and Bob do not share the entangled
states of the certain kind, then Alice can always extract
more information about the raw key bit following the
suggested strategy. The biasing on the bases of Alice de-
pends on the values of α and β. For example, if α = 12−
and β = 12 + , then Alice chooses {|φ0〉A ,
∣∣φ⊥0 〉A} with
probability 12 +  and chooses {|φ1〉A ,
∣∣φ⊥1 〉A} with prob-
ability 12 − .
To mitigate such problem, Bob has to remove his trust
from the devices and has to perform some local test at
his end to become sure that the states shared between
them are of the specific form [10]. As we consider the
entanglement version of the QPQ protocol, we suggest
a local statistical test which is actually CHSH test per-
formed locally. The difference is that for this test, we do
not require the perfect CHSH value. The value depends
on the value of θ.
However, when the states are of the form given in [10],
then the above strategy does not help Alice to extract
more information about the raw key bit. Let Bob and
Alice share the entangled states of the specific form and
Alice chooses her measurement bases {|φ0〉A ,
∣∣φ⊥0 〉A} and
{|φ1〉A ,
∣∣φ⊥1 〉A} with probability 12 −  and 12 +  respec-
tively. In this case, following Eq. (1), the success proba-
bility becomes sin
2 θ
2 .
Thus, it will be necessary for Bob to certify that those
shared states are of the certain form. In the following
section we propose a protocol which certify this. Thus,
Bob no longer requires to put trust on the source as well
as the detectors. By performing a test which is almost
like CHSH test at his end, he first checks whether the
states follow the desired property. Conditioning on the
success of the test, Bob proceeds for QPQ. Here, we con-
sider detectors with unit efficiency. However, for practi-
cal implementation of the suggested protocol, one has to
consider the detectors with non-unit efficiency.
One may wonder why we have not chosen quantum
state tomography to check whether the states are of the
certain form. The reason is that tomography would re-
quire an infinite number of states to achieve perfect ac-
curacy. On the other hand, choosing a different avenue
of local CHSH game, we are able to analyse the security
of our protocol for finite number of states.
IV. OUR PROTOCOL AND LOCAL CHSH
GAME
Before describing the proposed protocol, we first enu-
merate the assumptions required for the security of the
protocol. Those are summarized as follows.
1. Devices are causally independent, i.e., each use of
the device is independent of the previous use. This as-
sumption implies that the devices are memoryless.
2. Alice and Bob’s laboratories are perfectly secured
i.e., no information is leaked from their laboratories.
3. All the detectors at Bob’s end have unit efficiency
i.e., he always gets conclusive outcomes.
Our protocol is described in Algorithm 1. For brevity,
we write γn and (1− γ)n instead of dγne and b(1− γ)nc
respectively.
1. Bob starts with n number of entangled states.
2. Bob divides the given entangled pairs into two sets. One
is ΓCHSH and another is ΓQPQ. The set ΓCHSH
contains γn number of entangled states, whereas ΓQPQ
contains (1− γ)n number of the entangled states for
0 < γ < 1.
3. For rounds i ∈ {1, · · · , γn}
(a) Bob chooses xi ∈ {0, 1} and yi ∈ {0, 1} uniformly
at random.
(b) If xi = 0, he measures the first particle of the
entangled state in {|0〉 , |1〉} basis and if xi = 1, he
measures that in {|+〉 , |−〉} basis.
(c) Similarly, if yi = 0, Bob measures the second
particle of the entangled state in {|ψ1〉 ,
∣∣∣ψ⊥1 〉} basis and
if yi = 1, he measures that in {|ψ2〉 ,
∣∣∣ψ⊥2 〉} basis.
(d) The output is recorded as ai(bi) ∈ {0, 1} for the
first (second) particle. The encoding for ai(bi) is as
follows.
• For the first particle of each pair, ai = 0 if the
measurement result is |0〉 or |+〉; it is 1 if the
result would be |1〉 or |−〉.
• For the second particle of each pair, bi = 0 if the
measurement result is |ψ1〉 or |ψ2〉; it is 1 if the
measurement result would be
∣∣∣ψ⊥1 〉 or ∣∣∣ψ⊥2 〉, then
bi = 1.
(e) Testing: For the test round i ∈ ΓCHSH , define
Yi =
{
1 if ai ⊕ bi = xi ∧ yi
0 if otherwise.
4. If
1
γn
∑
i Yi <
1
8 (sin θ(sinψ1+sinψ2)+cosψ1−cosψ2)+ 12 ,
Bob aborts the protocol.
5. Conditioning on the event that the local CHSH test at
Bob’s end has been successful, Bob proceeds for the
subset ΓQPQ and sends one halves of the remaining
(1− γ)n number of entangled pairs to Alice.
6. Alice performs the private query phase as in [10].
Algorithm 1: Our Proposed protocol, Π
Note that we are dealing with several bases, namely,
{φ0, φ⊥0 }, {φ1, φ⊥1 }, {ψ1, ψ⊥1 } and {ψ2, ψ⊥2 }. It should
be clarified that where {φ0, φ⊥0 }, {φ1, φ⊥1 } bases are cho-
sen by Alice for QPQ protocol, {ψ1, ψ⊥1 } and {ψ2, ψ⊥2 }
bases are chosen by Bob to perform local CHSH test.
Here, we consider |ψ1〉 = cos ψ12 |0〉 + sin ψ12 |1〉 and
|ψ2〉 = cos ψ22 |0〉+ sin ψ22 |1〉.
In the QPQ protocol of [10], Bob measures his parti-
cles in {|0〉 , |1〉} basis only. Hence, the protocol can be
performed by the mixed states also. One may think that
for the local CHSH game, here, it is sufficient to measure
the first particle of Bob in {|0〉 , |1〉} basis only as Bob
does not need to test coherence (purity) of the states.
However, note that our proposal for local CHSH game
lies on the top of the QPQ protocol presented by Yang
et al [10]. One can replace the QPQ part by any other
entanglement based QPQ protocol which might not be
4FIG. 1: The value of Pr(ai ⊕ bi = xi ∧ yi) with respect to θ
performed by mixed states. Hence, it is necessary to use
{|+〉 , |−〉} basis in proposed CHSH test.
Next, we analyze case by case situation of the proposed
CHSH like test. Let Bob obtains the entangled states of
the form 1√
2
(|0〉B |φ0〉A + |1〉B |φ1〉A). We calculate the
conditional probabilities for each case and present those
in a tabular form in Table I.
Since Pr(xi, yi) =
1
4 for all xi, yi, multiplying each indi-
vidual probability in Table I by 14 gives the corresponding
joint probabilities. We have
Pr(ai ⊕ bi = xi ∧ yi) =
Pr((xi, yi) = (0, 0) & ((ai, bi) = (0, 0) OR (1, 1)))
+ Pr((xi, yi) = (0, 1) & ((ai, bi) = (0, 0) OR (1, 1)))
+ Pr((xi, yi) = (1, 0) & ((ai, bi) = (0, 0) OR (1, 1)))
+ Pr((xi, yi) = (1, 1) & ((ai, bi) = (0, 1) OR (1, 0))).
Adding the joint probabilities for the corresponding
rows, we find that the above quantity is equal to
1
8 [sin θ(sinψ1 + sinψ2) + (cosψ1 − cosψ2)] + 12 .
In Fig. 1, we plot the joint probability as
a function of θ, for the angles (ψ1, ψ2) =
{(pi4 , 3pi4 ), (3 pi16 , 13 pi16 ), (9 pi32 , 23 pi32 )}. A magnified view of
the plot for the region from θ = pi4 to θ =
pi
2 appears on
the right part of the figure. From the plot it is observed
that when θ = pi2 , the joint probability reaches the value
equal to cos2 pi8 .
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we prove the security of the proposed
protocol. In earlier section, we showed that if the shared
entangled states are not in a certain form, then Alice
may extract more information than what is suggested by
TABLE I: Conditional probability of (ai, bi) given (xi, yi)
(xi, yi) (ai, bi) Pr ((ai, bi) | (xi, yi))
(0, 0)
(0, 0) 1
2
cos2( θ−ψ1
2
)
(0, 1) 1
2
sin2( θ−ψ1
2
)
(1, 0) 1
2
cos2( θ+ψ1
2
)
(1, 1) 1
2
sin2( θ+ψ1
2
)
(0, 1)
(0, 0) 1
2
cos2( θ−ψ2
2
)
(0, 1) 1
2
sin2( θ−ψ2
2
)
(1, 0) 1
2
cos2( θ+ψ2
2
)
(1, 1) 1
2
sin2( θ+ψ2
2
)
(1, 0)
(0, 0) cos2( θ
2
) cos2 ψ1
2
(0, 1) cos2( θ
2
) sin2 ψ1
2
(1, 0) sin2( θ
2
) sin2 ψ1
2
(1, 1) sin2( θ
2
) cos2 ψ1
2
(1, 1)
(0, 0) cos2( θ
2
) cos2 ψ2
2
(0, 1) cos2( θ
2
) sin2 ψ2
2
(1, 0) sin2( θ
2
) sin2 ψ2
2
(1, 1) sin2( θ
2
) cos2 ψ2
2
the protocol. So, at the beginning of the protocol either
Bob has to trust devices blindly (device dependent as-
sumption on which the security of the existing protocols
depends) or he needs to test some statistical property by
measuring the given entangled states (device indepen-
dent assumption). The security of the proposed protocol
comes from the following result.
Theorem 1. If for a random subset ΓCHSH ⊂
{1, · · · , n} of size γn, where, γ > 0, the fraction of the
inputs (xi, yi), i ∈ ΓCHSH , which satisfy the CHSH con-
dition i.e., (ai ⊕ bi = xi ∧ yi) is equal to 18 (sin θ(sinψ1 +
5sinψ2) + cosψ1− cosψ2) + 12 − δ, then for the remaining
subset ΓQPQ ⊂ {1, · · · , n} of size (1− γ)n, a fraction of
inputs (xi, yi), i ∈ ΓQPQ, which satisfy the CHSH con-
dition, is also equal to 18 (sin θ(sinψ1 + sinψ2) + cosψ1 −
cosψ2) +
1
2 − δ with a negligible statistical deviation ν.
Here, δ =
√
1
2γn ln
1
CHSH
and ν =√
(γn+1)
2γ2(1−γ)n2 ln
1
QPQ
, CHSH and QPQ are negligi-
bly small value.
In the second result, we show that when n is sufficiently
large, then conditioned on the success of the above local
CHSH test, one may proceed for QPQ protocol proposed
by Yang et al. [10] for the remaining subset ΓQPQ.
Theorem 2. Conditioning on the event that local CHSH
test has been successful for the subset ΓCHSH , Bob can
proceed for the QPQ protocol for the remaining subset
ΓQPQ securely when n→∞.
In [10], the authors consider the security issues for two
cases: (a) dishonest Alice and honest Bob and (b) honest
Alice and dishonest Bob. As the second phase of our
protocol is the same as QPQ protocol proposed by Yang
et al. [10], the security issues for the second part of the
current protocol remains the same.
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this current draft, we propose a device independent
scenario in quantum private query. Exploiting the idea
of local CHSH test we show how Bob can remove his
trust from devices. The proposed protocol is divided in
two distinct parts. In the first part, Bob performs local
CHSH test at his end. Conditioning on the event that
the local CHSH test has been successful, Bob proceeds
for QPQ protocol. We here worked on the QPQ protocol
proposed by Yang et al. [10]. However, one can exploit
any entanglement based QPQ protocol for the second
phase of our proposed scheme. Here, we assume the de-
tectors have unit efficiency. However, it remains open
what would happen if the detectors are imperfect, i.e.,
having non-unit efficiency. To the best of our knowledge,
the proposed protocol is the first device independent pro-
tocol in the domain of quantum private query.
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be the number of random variables X1, X2, · · · , Xk cho-
sen from the list without replacement. Then for any value
of δ > 0, we have Pr [|X − x| ≥ δ] ≤ exp
(
−2δ2kn
(n−k+1)(b−a)
)
,
where X = 1k
∑
iXi.
Lemma 3. ( [23], Corollary to Serfling Lemma) Let
X = {x1, x2...xn} be a list of (not necessarily distinct)
values in [0, 1] with the average µX =
1
n
∑
i=1 xi. Let T
be a subset of X of size t with average µT = 1t
∑
i∈T xi.
Let K be the remaining subset of X with size k (i.e.,
t + k = n). If the average of the subset K is µK =
1
n−t
∑
i∈K xi, then for any value of  > 0, we have
Pr
(
|µK − µT| ≥
√
n(t+1)
2t2(n−t) ln
1

)
≤ .
Proof of Theorem 1:
Proof. We define a random variable Yi as follows: Yi = 1,
if ai⊕bi = xi∧yi; 0 otherwise. Now, we choose a random
subset ΓCHSH ⊂ {1, · · · , n} of size γn for any γ > 0 and
define Y = 1γn
∑
i∈ΓCHSH Yi. Here, Y is called observed
average value. Let the expected value of Y for that subset
be E(Y ) = 18 (sin θ(sinψ1 + sinψ2) + cosψ1 − cosψ2) +
1
2 . Then applying Chernoff bound (Lemma 1) we get
Pr [|Y − E(Y )| ≥ δ] ≤ exp(−2δ2γn).
Let CHSH be a negligibly small value. Equating
exp(−2δ2γn) with CHSH we can find the value of δ =√
1
2γn ln
1
CHSH
.
Again, we consider the remaining subset ΓQPQ ⊂
{1, · · · , n} of size (1 − γ)n and define Y ′ =
1
(1−γ)n
∑
i∈ΓQPQ Yi. Now, from Lemma 3, it can be
shown that Pr(|Y − Y ′| ≥ ν) ≤ exp
(
−2γ2ν2(n−γn)n3
(γn+1)n2
)
.
Let QPQ be a negligibly small value. Then, equating
the R.H.S with QPQ, we get ν.
Proof of Theorem 2:
Proof. In asymptotic limit, i.e., when n → ∞, the ex-
pressions for δ and ν tend to 0. This implies that in
asymptotic case, Y = Y ′ = E(Y). Thus by calculating
the value of Y for the subset ΓCHSH , Bob can certify
that entangled states for the subset ΓQPQ are of the de-
sired type and hence can be exploited securely for QPQ
protocol. Alice can not extract more information about
the raw key bits than suggested by the protocol.
